COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In the Marriage of ) 4 Civ. G022157; G022147
) OCSC Case No. 95D002992
JOHN A. B. )
Petitioner, )
vs. )
)
LUANNE H. B. )
Respondent. )
MINOR'S OPENING BRIEF
After Trial Court Ruling
Re Judgment On Reserved Issues
Judge Robert D. Monarch, Presiding
JEFFREY W. DOERINGER, ESQ.
LAW OFFICES OF JEFFREY W. DOERINGER
3090 Bristol Street, Suite 220
Costa Mesa, CA 92626
CSB #68835
(714) 957-6116
(714) 444-0736 Fax
Under Appointment by the
Court of Appeal, as attorney
for Minor, JAYCEE B.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii-vii
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED
A. JOHN'S PARENTAL OBLIGATION FOR JAYCEE'S SUPPORT IS CERTAIN AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN AFFIRMED BY THE TRIAL COURT, NOT TERMINATED 6
B. LUANNE SHOULD BE DECLARED JAYCEE'S LEGAL AND NATURAL MOTHER 15
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING THE SURROGACY AGREEMENT UNENFORCEABLE 21
D. THE TRIAL COURT RULINGS WERE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND RESULTED IN A MANIFEST INJUSTICE 22
1. Rulings Lack Substantial Evidence to Support Them 22
2. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion 23
3. The Issues Presented Are Issues of Law 24
E. SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT HAVE MADE A FEE ORDER FOR MINOR'S COUNSEL? 25
V. CONCLUSION 26
VI. PRAYER 27
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Civil Code:
Section 1661 22
Code of Civil Procedure:
Section 904.1 1
Evidence Code:
Section 451-459 3
Family Code:
Section 200 10
Section 2010 10
Section 3006 20
Section 3007 20
Section 3011 20
Section 3021 20
Section 3022 20
Section 3040 20
Section 3600 10
Section 3910 6 fn 9
Section 4001 6
Section 4006 6
Section 4007 6
Section 4011 6
Section 7602 15
Section 7639 28
Section 7650 20
Cases:
Adams, IRMO (1988)
174 Ill.App.3d 595, 528 N.E.2d 1075,
rev'd on other grounds 133 Ill.2d 437,
551 N.E.2d 635 12Adamson v. Adamson (1962)
209 Cal.App.2d 492 9Angelia P., In Re (1981)
28 Cal.3d 908 19Anonymous, Adoption of (1973)
74 Misc.3d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 13Ayo, IRMO (1987)
190 Cal.App.3d 442 11 fn 11Baby Doe, In Re (S.C. 1987)
353 S.E.2d 877 13-14Bonner, Adoption of (1968)
260 Cal.App.2d 17 10Chan v. Tsang (1991)
1 Cal.App.4th 1578 24Century Transit Systems, Inc. v.
American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (1996)
42 Cal.App.4th 121 24Ciganovich, IRMO (1976)
61 Cal.App.3d 289 23Clevenger v. Clevenger (1961)
189 Cal.App.2d 658 9, 9 fn 10,11,12County of San Luis Obispo v.
Nathaniel J. (1996)
50 Cal.App.4th 842 7County of Shasta v. Caruthers (1995)
31 Cal.App.4th 1838 8, 15County of Yolo v. Garcia (1993)
20 Cal.App.4th 1771 24Drake, IRMO (1997)
53 Cal.App.4th 1139 6 fn 9Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972)
405 U.S. 438 17, 21Estes v. Albers (S.D. 1993)
504 N.W.2d 607 12Freeman, IRMO (1996)
45 Cal.App.4th 1437 4 fn 7, 25Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994)
8 Cal.4th 791 25Goodarzirad, IRMO (1986)
185 Cal.App.3d 1020 11 fn 11, 16Gursky v. Gursky (1963)
39 Misc.2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 13Halpern, IRMO (1982)
133 Cal.App.3d 297 9Hurtado v. Statewide Home Loan Co. (1985)
167 Cal.App.3d 1019 24Jacobs, IRMO (1982)
128 Cal.App.3d 273 23Jaycee B. v. Superior Court (1996)
42 Cal.App.4th 718 1, 1 fn 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 18, 23, 24Johnson, IRMO (1979)
88 Cal.App.3d 848 9Johnson v. Calvert (1993)
5 Cal.4th 84 14, 17, 20, 21, 23, 26K.B. v. N.B. (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991)
811 S.W.2d 634 12, 13Kowis v. Howard (1992)
3 Cal.4th 888 24Kruse v. Bank of America (1988)
202 Cal.App.3d 38, 51 22Lambe and Meehan, IRMO (1995)
37 Cal.App.4th 388 11 fn 11Levin v. Levin (Ind. 1994)
645 N.E.2d 601 12Lippel, IRMO (1990)
51 Cal.3d 1160 7Lisi, IRMO (1995)
39 Cal.App.4th 1573 25Lorenzo T., In Re (1987)
190 Cal.App.3d 888 17Marsh v. Mountain Zephyr, Inc. (1996)
43 Cal.App.4th 289 1Matthew B., Adoption of (1991)
232 Cal.App.3d 1239 15, 18, 20, 21, 27McGinley v. Herman (1996)
50 Cal.App.4th 936 7Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)
262 U.S. 390 16Michelle T., In Re Adoption of (1975)
44 Cal.App.3d 699 19Moschetta, IRMO (1994)
25 Cal.App.4th 1218 17Muldrow, IRMO (1976)
61 Cal.App.3d 327 23Nathaniel J., In Re
50 Cal.Ap.4th 842 8, 9People v. Shuey (1975)
13 Cal.3d 835 24People v. Sorensen (1968)
68 Cal.2d 280 10, 11, 11 fn 11, 26People v. Stanley (1995)
10 Cal.4th 764 9Price v. Civil Service Comm. (1980)
26 Cal.3d 257 24Recknor, IRMO (1982)
138 Cal.App.3d 539 11Richter v. Superior Court (1976)
63 Cal.App.3d 748 24Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996)
44 Cal.App.4th 634 22Russo, IRMO (1971)
21 Cal.App.3d 72 16Ryan, IRMO (1994)
22 Cal.App.4th 841 16Sarah C., In Re (1992)
8 Cal.App.4th 964 12Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. (1985)
38 Cal.3d 425 9Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942)
316 U.S. 535 16, 21Smith, IRMO (1990)
225 Cal.App.3d 469 1 fn 1Spellens v. Spellens (1957)
49 Cal.2d 210 9Stanley v. Illinois (1972)
405 U.S. 645 16, 21Stephenson, IRMO (1984)
182 Cal.App.3d 1057 11Susan H. v. Jack S. (1994)
30 Cal.App.4th 1435 15Trask v. Superior Court (1994)
22 Cal.App.4th 346 5 fn 8Umphrey, IRMO (1990)
218 Cal.App.3d 647 11Valle, IRMO (1975)
53 Cal.App.3d 837 9Webber v. Webber (1948)
33 Cal.2d 153 24Winet v. Price (1992)
4 Cal.App.4th 1159 12Miscellaneous:
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973)
Goldstein 19California Constitution, art. I, § 7 17
Defining The Family: Law, Technology &
Reproductions In An Uneasy Age, N.Y.U. Press, Dolgin, 1997 14U.S. Constitution, 5th Amendment 17
U.S. Constitution, 9th Amendment 17
U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment 17
TO: THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT, DIVISION THREE.This matter is appealable, Code of Civil Procedure § 904.1(a)(1) and (a)(10). See also Marsh v. Mountain Zephyr, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 289, 295.
This matter returns to the Court of Appeals as predicted in Jaycee B. v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 718, 731. The anticipated appeal from a judgment after trial involves JAYCEE's right to support and her right to have a parent-child relationship. The trial court terminated Petitioner's (hereinafter "JOHN")1 obligation of support which had been in effect as a result of the Jaycee B. decision (42 Cal.App.4th 718)2, refused to declare the legality of the mother-child (LUANNE-JAYCEE)3 relationship, and held the surrogacy contract unenforceable (Exhibit "O"). All of said rulings are alleged as error. JAYCEE appealed and on October 7, 1997, this Honorable Court issued a Writ of Supersedeas and other orders including expedited briefing. LUANNE joined in the Appeal.
1. JAYCEE is in existence and is a living, breathing 2- year old (DOB: 4-26-95)[human being] child.4
2. JAYCEE came into existence via the acts and intentions of the parties involved in this litigation which included anonymous egg and sperm donors, a willing surrogate (PAMELA)5 and her husband, and a married couple, LUANNE and JOHN. It is conceded that all parties signed the contract and that the implantation occurred in the contracting surrogate and a child was thereupon created, to wit, JAYCEE. (Exhibit "I" contains surrogacy agreement at pp. 147-186).
3. JOHN filed for divorce on March 30, 1995, well after implantation, and alleged there were no children of the marriage. (JAYCEE B. Petition filed January 18, 1996, Exhibit "A", p.2, hereinafter "1/18/96 Petition"). This was disputed by LUANNE (1/18/96 Petition, Exhibit "B", pp.4-6) and a request for custody and support resulted in a hearing on November 30, 1995 (1/18/96 Petition, Exhibit "D"). (See R.T. 11/30/95 filed in Case No. G019080). Counsel for JAYCEE was thereupon appointed by the trial court. (1/18/96 Petition, Exhibit "F", pp.56-57).
4. Attorney JEFFREY W. DOERINGER thereupon filed the Writ Petition which resulted in the Jaycee B. decision by this Honorable Court heretofore-mentioned.[(42 Cal.App.4th 718 - Minor's Noticed Request for Judicial Notice of the pleadings and briefings in said case was filed in this cause on September 12, 1997, as part of Minor's Request for Approval of Appellant's Appendix (See ¶ 3 thereof), Evidence Code § 451-459]. See also Petition for Writ of Supersedeas (G022147) filed September 8, 1997, particularly p.3, ¶ 3.
5. This Honorable Court issued a published decision on the Writ Petition in a prompt and judicious fashion on February 6, 1996. (Jaycee B. v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th. 718).
6. The trial court followed said decision by issuing a temporary support order on March 22, 1996 (Exhibit "A").6
7. Thereafter, PAMELA (and spouse) intervened and sought custody by filing pleadings (and being joined) on September 11, 1996. However, this surrogate is now out of the case by stipulations, dismissal, orders, and default. (Exhibits "K" and "L").
8. A Pretrial Status Conference was held on February 4, 1997. Counsel addressed LUANNE'S Motion for blood tests as to PAMELA and RANDY and thereupon PAMELA and RANDY announced they were getting out of the case and stipulated they were not the biological parents of JAYCEE (R.T. 2/4/97, pp.17:9-10, 27:13-18, 35:14-21).
The issue of JOHN'S ultimate accountability for JAYCEE'S support came up and the trial court expressed significant misgivings on finding him ultimately to be a legal parent (R.T. 2/4/97, p.21:11-20, 23:12-16).
The court queried regarding factual disputes and JOHN only raised one new fact - that he signed the Agreement after
implantation (R.T. 2/4/97, pp.19:15-19, 24:23-25, 25:1-25, 26:1-23).
A gag order (Temporary Restraining Order) issued after some debate (R.T. 2/4/97, pp.27:19-31:25).
9. Trial was held on March 13, 1997. Being primarily legal issues the matter was briefed (Exhibits "H", "I" & "J") and thoroughly argued (R.T. 3/13/97), and any party was granted the opportunity to produce evidence. The only evidence which was offered and which was new came from Petitioner's counsel as an [apparent] Offer of Proof that JOHN signed the surrogacy contract after implantation had already occurred.7
A synopsis of the trial is as follows: Once again the court queried re: factual issues (R.T. 3/13/97, pp. 6:9-25, 12:17-23, 53:6-8).
On the first legal issue of whether LUANNE is the legal mother of JAYCEE, the trial court found she was not. (R.T. 3/13/97, pp.7:1-14:3.
As to JOHN's responsibility for JAYCEE and the obligation of support, the court terminated same as inappropriate (R.T. 3/13/97, pp. 14:4-18:17).
On the issue of determination of the existence of a mother-child relationship and the legal status thereof, the court noted that "sooner or later, she is going to get it", but declined to declare LUANNE a legal mother. (R.T. 3/13/97, pp. 24:17-55:2).
10. After vigorous and thorough argument the matter was submitted and the court ruled (R.T. 3/13/97).
11. The formal judgment was entered on August 29, 1997 (Exhibit "O"). The trial court, inter alia, terminated JOHN's obligation to pay support for JAYCEE (and denied a stay request of this order), would not declare LUANNE the legal mother of JAYCEE nor grant her full custody (despite requests therefor). The trial court held that the Agreement was unenforceable.
12. The trial court deferred minor counsel's fee request to May 7, 1997, at which time it directed the County of Orange to pay a share but deferred decision on all other parties' responsibilities therefor (R.T. 5/7/97, Exhibit "O" @ pp.235:19-27, 236:1-14).8
13. On September 4, 1997, JAYCEE filed a Notice of Appeal and on September 8, 1997, she filed, through counsel, a Petition for Writ of Supersedeas and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Ancillary Relief. (G022147).
14. A temporary stay order and other relief was issued by this Honorable Court on September 9, 1997, and, after informal briefing, this Honorable Court issued a Writ of Supersedeas on October 7, 1997, staying the trial court's termination of child support order, issued a temporary legal custody order vested in LUANNE, and ordered expedited briefing, et al.
A. JOHN'S PARENTAL OBLIGATION FOR JAYCEE'S SUPPORT IS CERTAIN AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN AFFIRMED BY THE TRIAL COURT, NOT TERMINATED.
Parental responsibility has a long history. The Legislature has now placed relevant historical statutes within the Family Code. Family Code § 3900 states:
"Subject to this division, the father and mother of a minor child have an equal responsibility to support their child in the manner suitable to the child's circumstances."
This obligation continues until adulthood or emancipation. See, e.g. Family Code § § 3901, 4007.9
"In any proceeding where there is at issue the support of a minor child or a child for whom support is authorized under Section 3901 the court may order either or both parents to pay an amount necessary for the support of the child."
See also § 4006. This child support obligation is of paramount significance (Family Code § 4011) and is a priority debt.
The Legislature adopted a statewide guideline which is "presumptively correct in all cases" (Family Code § 4053(k)). Policies underlying this guideline are mandatory considerations by the court (Family Code § § 12, 4053). These sections provide:
"In implementing the statewide uniform guideline, the courts shall adhere to the following principles:
(a) A parent's first and principal obligation is to support his or her minor children according to the parent's circumstances and station in life.
(b) Both parents are mutually responsible for the support of their children.
. . .
(d) Each parent should pay for the support of the children according to his or her ability.
(e) The guideline seeks to place the interests of children as the state's top priority.
. . .
(h) the financial needs of the children should be met through private financial resources as much as possible."
. . .
(l) Child support orders must ensure that children actually receive fair, timely, and sufficient support reflecting the state's high standard of living and high costs of raising children compared to other states.
The California courts have historically protected the child's right to support and this history cannot be ignored. "Without question the state has a duty and responsibility to protect the rights of children affected by the decisions of its courts..."(In Re Marriage of Lippel (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1160, 1171).
"A child has important rights of his own.... The single most important consideration in an action for support is the need of the child (In Re Marriage of Lippel (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1160, 1172 fn 4).
"California law provides that every child has a right to support from both parents. (Family Code § § 3900, 3901)." (County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 842, 845, emp. added). "Children are entitled to share in the standard of living of both parents." (McGinley v. Herman (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 936, 938. (Emp. added).
The focus must be on JAYCEE's best interests. "Best interests" encompass this right to support. Support is the essence of existence of a small child (together with the love and care of her parent(s)).
"The duty to support one's child is one of the oldest provisions of California Law .... California assigns to both the father and the mother of any child an equal and continuing responsiblity to support their child." (County of Shasta v. Caruthers (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1838, 1849).
In the Nathaniel J. case, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 842, the appellate court held that a minor was obligated to pay child support for his child, despite the fact that he was "statutorily raped" by a thirty-four year old woman. Renowned family law commentator Stephen Adams analyzes this judicial conclusion in 1997 CFLR 7363: "The only totally innocent party in this whole scenario is the child that was conceived from this union. She is entitled to be supported by both of her parents, no matter what the circumstances of her conception." (Emp. added).
This statement cuts to the essence of the issue at bar. The duty of support owed by a person who brings a child into this world is a paramount and overriding public policy. The child's interest in receiving support overrides any countervailing policy or equitable argument, Nathaniel J., supra, 50 Cal. App. 4th @ pp.845-846.
JAYCEE clearly falls within the parameters of this statement and overriding policy. First, she is innocent; second, she was created by the conduct, acts and intentions of the parties; and third, she was created with the intention that she would be raised by LUANNE and JOHN. This creates a corresponding responsibility and obligation of support.
This Honorable Court in Jaycee B. v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal. App. 4th 718 held that "the family court had jurisdiction to enter a pendente lite child support order pending final determination of the husband's paternity," @ p.718. It also noted that the case is the functional equivalent of a paternity action "where a mother who is the caretaker of a child seeks court-ordered support from a man but for whose actions the child would never have come into existence," @ p.723. It must be noted that the Court of Appeal opinion, to the extent and scope of its ruling, is law of the case. See, e.g., People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal. 4th 764, 786; Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 425, 434-435.
There is a long history of California cases holding persons accountable for support of a child they have created or upon whom the law imputes an obligation, e.g., Nathaniel J., supra, 50 Cal. App. 4th 842. See also Spellens v. Spellens (1957) 49 Cal.2d 210, 213; Clevenger v. Clevenger (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 664; Adamson v. Adamson (1962) 209 Cal.App. 2d 492, 499. In Re Marriage of Johnson (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 848; In Re Marriage of Valle (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 837; and In Re Marriage of Halpern (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 297.10
JAYCEE'S interests in this regard, i.e., proper support, are the "state's top priority" and ensurance of receipt of proper
support is also a strong public policy, Family Code § 4053(e), (h)&(l).
Based on the foregoing authorities and the fact that JAYCEE would not exist, but for the acts and intentions of LUANNE and JOHN, evidence her entitlement under the law to adequate support from both her parents.
And, certainly the trial court has jurisdiction to award child support in such a case. (Jaycee B. v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 718). See also Adoption of Bonner (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 17, 21, where the Court declared:
"It is well established... that a court in a divorce action has jurisdiction to determine as between the parties the parentage of children and to provide for their custody and support."
See also Family Code § § 200, 2010, 3600.
In People v. Sorensen (1968) 68 Cal.2d 280 our Supreme Court held that a husband was a "lawful father" of a child created by artificial insemination whom he was obligated to support where he consented to the procedure, during marriage, and actively participated in the acts which created the child.
"The law is that defendant is the lawful father of the child born to his wife, which child was conceived by artificial insemination to which he consented."
"...the term 'father'... cannot be limited to the biologic or natural father as those terms are generally understood."
"a reasonable man who... actively participates ... in the hope that a child will be produced whom they will treat as their own, knows that such behavior carries with it the legal responsibilities of fatherhood... One who consents to the production of a child cannot create a temporary relation to be assumed and disclaimed at will.... it is safe to assume that without defendant's active participation and consent the child would not have been procreated."
People v. Sorensen (1968) 68 Cal.2d 280, 283-285. (Emp. added)
In the case at bar, JOHN participated in numerous surrogacy attempts as well as the surrogacy arrangement here at issue and expressed the finality and irrevocability of his intentions and consent when he signed the surrogacy agreement. (Exhibit "I", at pp. 147-186).11
JOHN's conduct should raise an estoppel to prevent him from denying his obligation of support. "Estoppel applies to prevent a person from asserting a right where his conduct... makes it unconscionable for him to assert it." (In Re Marriage of Stephenson (1984) 182 Cal.App.3d 1057, 1072). See also Evidence Code § 623; In Re Marriage of Umphrey (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 647, 658; In Re Marriage of Recknor (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 539, 546. It does not require but to say that it is egregiously unconscionable for JOHN to deny responsibility for JAYCEE, after the fact.
Parentage by estoppel is not a new concept. In Clevenger v. Clevenger (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 658 the Court noted the "basic moral and social considerations impel the full protection of the child", @ p.664; "[I]f the facts would establish an express agreement for the maintenance of the child or an estoppel as to the child... the husband would be liable for the child's support", @ pp. 664-665.
"The relationship of father and child is too sacred to be thrown off like an old cloak, used and unwanted. We are dealing with the care and education of a child during his minority and with the obligation of the party who has assumed as a father to discharge it. The law is not so insensitive as to countenance the breach of an obligation in so vital and deep a relation, undertaken, partially fulfilled, and suddenly sundered."
See also: Levin v. Levin (Ind. 1994) 645 N.E.2d 601, 604-605 [Husband's consent to artificial insemination estops him from being relieved of child support obligation; child is "child of the marriage"]; In Re Marriage of Adams (1988) 174 Ill.App.3d 595, 528 N.E.2d 1075, Reversed on other grounds 133 Ill.2d 437, 551 N.E.2d 635 [consent to procedure warrants application of estoppel to prevent denial of child support obligation by husband].
And, K.B. v. N.B. (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991) 811 S.W.2d 634, 639 [artificial insemination is not an ordinary transaction.... It brings new life into being.... This transaction could not be rescinded, and nothing like restitution is possible.... The court properly ordered child support....]; Estes v. Albers (S.D. 1993) 504 N.W.2d 607, 609 [arranged pregnancy; child support waiver void as against public policy and contrary to the best interest of the child.].
See also, In Re Sarah C. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 964, 974 ["...parental rights are generally conferred on a man ... based ... on the father's connection to the mother...."]. And, in Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1172, the Court noted:
"[The] law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts. It judges of his intention by his outward expressions and excludes all questions in regard to his unexpressed intention. If his words or acts, judged by a reasonable standard, manifest an intention to agree in regard to the matter in question, that agreement is established, and it is immaterial what may be the real but unexpressed state of his mind on that subject."
In combining the foregoing with the Winet and Sorensen principles, it can be gleaned that JOHN's execution of the Agreement and the expression of the terms in the Agreement properly and reasonably evidence significant intentions and consent, from which reliance [by others] and responsibility, flow. A husband who agrees to procreate, by whatever means, during marriage, carries with it consequences, including responsibility for the child thereupon created. (People v. Sorensen (1968) 68 Cal.2d 280, 283-285; Winet, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th @ p.1172; K.B. v. N.B., supra, 811 S.W.2d @ p.639).
Other cases from outside this state are also instructive, and illuminating.
In Gursky v. Gurksy (1963) 39 Misc.2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 412, the court held husband, who consented to artificial insemination procedure, liable for support under either an implied contract or equitable estoppel theory.
Ten years later, in Adoption of Anonymous (1973) 74 Misc.2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 the court held that a husband who consented to artificial insemination procedure, during marriage, was a "parent."
And, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that a husband who assented to such a procedure (implied by conduct and failure to object) was the resulting child's legal father and thus chargeable with all responsibilities, including support. (In Re Baby Doe (S.C. 1987) 353 S.E.2d 877). The Baby Doe court held that a writing was not required, but that the husband's implied consent flowed from knowledge of the procedure and failure to object, @ p.879.
In the case at bar, we have express intentions well-defined in a written document. JOHN admittedly signed same. There is no evidence he disavowed this express consent in a timely fashion, nor is there evidence of objection to the surrogacy arrangements as they progressed. It was only on the eve of JAYCEE's birth that he attempted to disavow his legal responsibility when he filed his dissolution petition and claimed "no children of the marriage" existed (1/18/96 Petition, Exhibit "A").
This undue delay is tantamount to waiver. His express and implied consent helped perpetuate the series of events which culminated in JAYCEE's birth. From such intention and consent flow responsibility.
In analyzing the Calvert decision, Janet L. Dolgin notes: "Changes of heart may occur and be unfortunate for the parties, but they cannot challenge the force of the original intent or the law's readiness to ensure the actualization of that intent." (Dolgin, Defining The Family: Law, Technology & Reproduction In An Uneasy Age, N.Y.U. Press, 1997, p.193).
As minor's counsel expressed in oral argument below, the Agreement is "indicia", or further evidence, of the knowledge, participation, and consent by all parties. (R.T. 3/13/97, pp. 41-53). Implied consent or tacit consent and the parties' knowledge and understanding are evidenced, in this instance, by express words and phrases. The law can easier assign responsibility for conduct and knowledge when there is a visual expression via written contract. Completion of the intended results of that contract is likewise a relevant consideration. JAYCEE is in existence and "of necessity must be reared by parents." (Adoption of Matthew B. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1239, 1257).
Whether through the analysis of implied consent, equitable estoppel, or express consent, the result must be the same. To deny JOHN's legal responsibility would be seriously "unconscionable."
B. LUANNE SHOULD BE DECLARED JAYCEE'S LEGAL AND NATURAL MOTHER.
JAYCEE has a fundamental and constitutional right to a judicial declaration of, and affirmation of, her mother-child relationship with LUANNE. See, e.g., Family Code § 7602.
"The establishment of the parent-child relationship is the most fundamental right a child possesses to be equated in importance with personal liberty and the most basic of constitutional rights." (County of Shasta v. Caruthers (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1838, 1844-1845).
"We acknowledge that '...the establishment of the parent-child relationship is the most fundamental right a child possesses to be
equated in importance with personal liberty and the most basic of constitutional rights.' (Ruddock v. Ohls (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 271,277-278)...."
"....Susan H. acknowledges the state's significant and legitimate interests in preserving the integrity of the family unit and protecting the child's welfare...."
"As the trial court aptly observed, the state has a legitimate interest in the 'social stability of the dissolving family.'...."
"The state has an 'interest in preserving and protecting the developed parent-child and sibling relationships which give young children social and emotional strength and stability.'"
Susan H. v. Jack S. (1994)
30 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1441-1442 (Emp. added).The public policy of the State of California favors protecting the rights of children and parents, not limiting them. (See In Re Marriage of Ryan (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 841, 848 ["California ha[s] a substantial interest in fostering the best interests of the child and familial responsibility."]).
"...it is for the trial court to determine, after considering all the evidence, how the best interests of the child will be subserved. The question is to be determined solely from the standpoint of the child, and the feelings and desires of the contesting parties are not to be considered, except in so far as they affect the best interest of the child."
"'In a divorce proceeding involving the custody of a minor, primary consideration must be given to the welfare of the child.'"
"The essence of custody is the companionship of the child and the right to make decisions regarding his care and control, education, health, and religion."
In Re Marriage of Russo (1971)
21 Cal.App.3d 72, 86-89 (Emp. added)."The ultimate aim of the court is to serve the best interests and welfare of the minor children."
"'...jurisdiction...is to be exercised, in the interests of children. It is their right to have the court hear and determine all matters which concern their welfare and they cannot be deprived of this right.... The welfare of the children is of interest to the state."
In Re Marriage of Goodarzirad (1986)
185 Cal.App.3d 1020, 1026-1027 (emp. added).LUANNE has significant rights along with those of JAYCEE. LUANNE's right to procreative liberty is a cognizable interest. (Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) 316 U.S. 535, 541 ["Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."]; Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) 262 U.S. 390; Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645, 651 ["The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential'..., 'basic civil rights of man'..., and 'rights far more precious ... than property rights.'"]; Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) 405 U.S. 438; In Re Lorenzo T. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 888, 891 ["Parental rights to conceive and raise children are deemed essential, basic civil rights of man, ... which should be accorded a high degree of protection."] Also, U.S. Constitution 5th, 14th and 9th Amendments; California Constitution, art. I, § 7.
Our Supreme Court has discussed the surrogacy situation in Johnson v. Calvert (1993) 5 Cal.4th 84, and set forth parameters for determining legal parenthood.
"...she who intended to procreate the child ... is the natural mother under California Law."
"'...intentions that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained-for ought presumptively to determine legal parenthood.'"
"...a rule recognizing the intended parents as the child's legal, natural parents should best promote certainty and stability for the child."
Johnson v. Calvert (1993)
5 Cal.4th 84, 93-96. (emp. added)See also:
"'California law recognizes only one natural mother'...."
"...'gestational' surrogacy differs from adoption in 'crucial respects' and therefore 'is not subject to the adoption statutes'."
"Infertile couples who can afford the high-tech solution ...in another's womb can be reasonably assured of being judged the legal parents of the child, even if the surrogate reneges on her agreement .... surrogacy is fundamentally different than adoption."
In Re Marriage of Moschetta (1994)
25 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1229-1235. (emp. added)This Honorable Court has also assessed this issue, at some length, in Jaycee B. v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 718. In that case, this Court held that the family law court had jurisdiction to issue a pendente lite support order and that for all practical purposes JOHN "caused JAYCEE's conception every bit as much as if he had caused her birth the old fashioned way"; Intentions are relevant and must be considered, Jaycee B., supra, 42 Cal.App.4th @ pp.729-730.
The fourth surrogacy case out of California to date (and the oldest) is Adoption of Matthew B. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1239. That court noted the importance of focusing on the child's best interests.
"The primary casualty of this conflict is a child caught in the cross fire .... The best interests of this young child must be our paramount concern."
Adoption of Matthew B. (1991)
232 Cal. App. 3d 1239, 1251
The Court in Matthew B. refused to determine the legality or illegality of the surrogate contract. Having been fully performed, "it is unnecessary to determine its legality," @ p.1256. The Court went on to point out the proper focus:
"Here, the state has a paramount interest in Matthew's welfare.... We can never ignore the child's best interests, 'no matter what preliminary action its parent or parents may have taken'.... Indeed the child's welfare is 'the controlling force in directing its custody, and the courts will always have to look to this rather than to whims and caprices of the parties.' .... Accordingly, even if we assume that the parties' conduct was illegal, the state's paramount interest in Matthew's welfare overrides its interest in 'deterring illegal conduct.' .... 'The reality is that [Matthew] is in being and of necessity must be reared by parents.'"
Matthew B., supra (1991)
232 Cal. App. 3d @ p.1257. (Emp. added)
The Matthew B. court went on:
"The 'best interests' standard is an 'an elusive guideline that belies rigid definition. Its purpose is to maximize a child's opportunity to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult ... The best interests of the child is in being raised by the best parent.'"
"Courts must weigh ... and determine the child's best interests solely from the standpoint of the child, and should not consider the feelings and desires of the contesting parties, except insofar as they affect the child's best interests."
"Finally, the 'best interests' standard is a relative one. 'The question is not whether a particular set of circumstances is in the best interest of the child, but whether a particular set of circumstances relative to an alternative set of circumstances is in the best interest of the child.'"
"A best-interests determination depends 'upon a true assessment of the emotional bonds between parent and child, upon an inquiry into 'the heart of the parent-child relationship .. the ethical, emotional, and intellectual guidance the parent gives to the child throughout his formative years, and often beyond.' It must reflect also a factual determination of how best to provide continuity of attention, nurturing, and care. (Burchard v. Garay (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531, 540). Thus, crucial to a best-interests determination is 'the importance of stability and continuity in the life of a child, and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds.' Indeed, '[s]tability, continuity, and a loving relationship are the most important criteria for determining the best interests of the child.' (Id., at p.542 (conc. opn. of Bird, C.J., italics added.)" (Emp. added)
Matthew B., supra, @ pp.1263-1264.
Other courts and commentators have analyzed best interests from the standpoint of "least detrimental alternative." This is considered appropriate. See, e.g., In Re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal. 3d 908, 917; In Re Adoption of Michelle T. (1975) 44 Cal. App. 3d 699; Goldstein, et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973), pp. 53-54.
Thus, whether focusing on the legal standard as "best interests" or "least detrimental alternative," the result in the case at bar must be the same.12 JAYCEE has lived with LUANNE since birth, has been cared for and nurtured by LUANNE exclusively, and there is no valid assertion that this status quo and bonded relationship should be interrupted. JAYCEE is happy, well-adjusted, and well cared for. LUANNE is a de facto parent.
There is no one in the world, other than LUANNE, who has accepted JAYCEE into her household, held her out as her own child, and dutifully cared for and raised JAYCEE since birth. (Cf. Family Code § 7650). It is JAYCEE's best interests that warrant a judicial declaration of the existence of a legal mother-child relationship between these individuals who are joined in love and caring, and joined in life. To deny the existence of this relationship is contrary to natural law and common practical sense. The relationship is real, genuine, ongoing, and promotes JAYCEE's best interests and welfare. (Family Code § § 3006, 3007, 3011, 3021(a), 3022 & 3040(a)(1)).
JAYCEE's existence is an unalterable fact. JAYCEE was conceived with the intention that LUANNE (and JOHN) would raise her and LUANNE has faithfully carried out her responsibility. The State's interest in recognizing the integrity and existence of this mother-child relationship is significant as is its protection of JAYCEE's welfare in the recognition of this relationship. (Adoption of Matthew B., supra, 232 Cal.App.3d @ p.1273; Johnson v. Calvert, supra, 5 Cal.4th @ pp.93-95). The parties' creation of JAYCEE is a fait accompli and the universal expectations and intentions as expressed in the agreement and by the initiating acts of the parties was that this mother-child relationship would come into being along with the birth of JAYCEE (Exhibit "I" at pp.147-186).
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING THE SURROGACY AGREEMENT UNENFORCEABLE.
Our Supreme Court pointed out that the surrogacy agreement in that case was not "inconsistent with public policy." (Johnson v. Calvert, supra, 5 Cal.4th @ p.95). "[W]e believe [tradition] supports the claim" of the right to procreate " in order to form a family .... albeit through novel medical procedures ... It is not the role of the judiciary to inhibit the use of reproductive technology when the Legislature has not seen fit to do so; any such effort would raise serious questions in light of the fundamental nature of the rights of procreation and privacy." (Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.4th @ pp.99-101). See also, ante, Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) 316 U.S. 535; Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645; Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) 405 U.S. 438.
And, see Adoption of Matthew B. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1239, where the Court pointed out the contract having been performed makes illegality determination unnecessary, @ p.1256. JAYCEE is in existence and the enforceability and/or legality or other attributes of the agreement are now only of historical value. The reality is that JAYCEE exists and the parties acted as per the agreement. The intended result has been achieved; and JOHN's filing for divorce (an unanticipated event) and his disavowment of responsibility does not alter JAYCEE's existence nor does it, nor should it, alter the responsibility flowing from that creation, intention, and volitional action (Family Code § § 3900, 3901, 4053(a)-(f),(h),(k) & (l); Civil Code § 1661, Evidence Code § 623; Winet v. Price, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1172).
D. THE TRIAL COURT RULINGS WERE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND RESULTED IN A MANIFEST INJUSTICE.
1. Rulings Lack Substantial Evidence to Support Them.
There was no substantial evidence to support the trial court's rulings as to relieving JOHN of the obligation of support, or of finding the surrogacy contract unenforceable, or in refusing to recognize the mother-child relationship.
"'Substantial' evidence, however, is not synonymous with 'any' evidence. To constitute sufficient substantiality to support the verdict, the evidence must be 'reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be 'substantial' proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case."
Kruse v. Bank of America (1988)
202 Cal.App.3d 38, 51"The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record ... One of the very purposes of review is to uncover just such irrational findings and thus preclude the risk of affirming a finding that should be disaffirmed as a matter of law."
. . .
"Substantial evidence is therefore not merely an appellate incantation designed to conjure up an affirmance ... An appellate court need not 'blindly seize any evidence in order to affirm the judgment.'"
. . .
"Whatever the nature of the evidence, truth is an ascendant value in litigation. Not every bald assertion rises to the dignity of substantial evidence. Transparent prevarication is not an acceptable basis for decision."
Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996)
44 Cal.App.4th 634, 652-654. (emp. added).
2. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion
"Reversal is in order where it is apparent that the court applied an erroneous standard." (In Re Marriage of Ciganovich (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 289, 294).
While the trial court has discretion, this discretion cannot disregard the law and the pronouncements of this Honorable Court which have at least a strong inference of "law of the case." (Jaycee B., supra, 42 Cal.App.4th 718.) Nor can it disregard (per stare decisis) the pronouncements in Johnson v. Calvert (1993) 5 Cal.4th 84 (regarding "intentions").
"Legal discretion has been defined as an impartial discretion taking into account all relevant facts, together with legal principles essential to an informed and just decision; it is not a mental discretion, to be exercised ex gratia, but a legal discretion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice. (Citations omitted).
Judicial discretion
"... implies absence of arbitrary determination, capricious disposition or whimsical thinking. It imports the exercise of discriminating judgment within the bounds of reason ... to exercise the power of judicial discretion all the material facts in evidence must be known and considered, together also with the legal principles essential to an informed, intelligent and just decision." (Citation omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
In Re Marriage of Muldrow (1976)
61 Cal.App.3d 327, 332. (emp. added).
The discretion conferred upon this court "is a discretion governed by legal rules, to do justice according to law or to the analogies of the law, as near as may be." (County of Yolo v. Garcia (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1771, 1778).
"... trial court discretion - is not a sacrosanct concept ... trial courts have discretion only the to extent appellate courts perceive a reason to defer. The breadth of trial court discretion is a function of the degree to which appellate courts exercise deference."
Hurtado v. Statewide Home Loan Co. (1985)
167 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1022.Our Supreme Court pointed out in Webber v. Webber (1948) 33 Cal.2d 153, 155: "the trial of a case should not only be fair in fact, but it should also appear to be fair. And where the contrary appears, it shocks the judicial instinct to allow the judgment to stand."
It is respectfully submitted that the Jaycee B. v. Superior Court decision (42 Cal.App.4th 718) is "law of the case" as to the issue of JOHN's responsibility for JAYCEE's support. See Price v. Civil Service Comm. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 257, 267 fn 5; Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 893-894; Richter v. Superior Court (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 748, 758; People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835, 841-846.
3. The Issues Presented Are Issues of Law
"If facts are not in dispute, the issue is one of law. If the issue is one of law, then the appellate court is free to reach its own conclusions of law from the undisputed facts." (Chan v. Tsang (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1583).
An appellate court reviews "de novo the legal effect and consequences of the undisputed facts demonstrated by the record."
(Century Transit Systems, Inc. v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 121, 125).
See also Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799-800 ["when the decisive facts are undisputed, we are confronted with a question of law and are not bound by the findings of the trial court....questions of law are reviewed under a non-deferential standard, affording plenary review."]
The three issues heretofore raised are issues of law subject to de novo review. JOHN'S obligation based on the undisputed facts, the nature of the mother-child relationship and the enforceability (and/or interpretation) of the agreement are issues of law. It is respectfully asserted that the trial court erred in its rulings as to each of these items.
Trial was held on March 13, 1997. Facts not presented or issues not raised or articulated [by JOHN] at trial are waived. (In Re Marriage of Freeman (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1450-1451).
E. SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT HAVE MADE A FEE ORDER FOR MINOR'S COUNSEL?
On May 7, 1997 the issue of minor's counsel's fees came on for hearing as a supplemental trial issue. (R.T. 5/7/97). Counsel for JAYCEE asserted compensation orders should be made at that time. (Exhibit "H", pp. 113-115. R.T. 5/7/97, pp. 7:1-6, 8:4-20, 9:11-25, 10:7-16, 12:9-25, 13-18:20, particularly pp. 17:10-19, 20:15-16). The trial court reserved jurisdiction until the County paid its share (not yet occurred) and thus the issue was not resolved (Exhibit "O", pp. 235:19-27, 236:1-14). Should it have been resolved? Family Code § 3153 is written in the mandatory throughout its provisions. See Family Code § 12. In Re Marriage of Lisi (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1573, 1576 asserts the duty to award fees is mandatory and the right to receive compensation is vested and accrued at the time the order is to be made. (Exhibit "H", pp. 113-115).
The trial presented legal issues. JOHN and LUANNE had set in motion a long history of procreative attempts culminating in the Surrogacy Agreement here before the Court. All the parties intended the result that LUANNE (and JOHN) would receive the child as intended parents. (Exhibit "I", pp. 147-186).
JOHN made no effort to withdraw any consent (as evidenced by his signature on the Agreement). Thus, whether he knew when he "signed" that implantation had already occurred or whether he "signed" and only found out later, it matters not. He actively participated in the venture, he was a significant party, and he assented to the Surrogacy Agreement and its terms by executing same. The result of the formation and implementation of that contract (and all its particulars and precursors) was the creation of JAYCEE who was born on 4/26/95. That cannot be undone. Estoppel prevents JOHN from proposing to undo this birth of a human being. JOHN cannot run "hot and cold" on so heavy a responsibility as creating new human life. (People v. Sorensen, supra, 68 Cal.2d @ p.285).
The "focus" was on creating [JAYCEE] when the contract was formed, negotiated, reviewed, circulated, and executed. The focus must now be on the responsibility for JAYCEE as a "legal father." (People v. Sorensen (1968) 68 Cal.2d 280). JOHN is a "legal father" and JAYCEE is entitled to such a judicial declaration. She is entitled to monthly support as a significant corollary or adjunct thereto.
JAYCEE has a loving temporary custodial parent in LUANNE. She is entitled to a judicial declaration and ratification of the ongoing essence of this de facto mother-child relationship. LUANNE is JAYCEE'S legal and natural mother. (Johnson v. Calvert supra, 5 Cal 4th @ p.93 ["...she who intended to procreate the child - that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own - is the natural mother under California law."]).
The Agreement has been executed. It's terms have been executed. It is a "done deal". The parties' intentions have been fulfilled. Judicial approbation of this conduct and result is now sought. This approbation must take into account JAYCEE'S welfare and best interests. The judicial system must protect her and her right to exist, just as the system protects other children. (Adoption of Matthew B., supra, 232 Cal.App.3d @ p. 1257).
The judgments of the trial court must be reversed.
WHEREFORE, JAYCEE prays that this Honorable Court:
1. Give her a "mom"; i.e., declare the existence, validity, and legality of the mother-child relationship; LUANNE is JAYCEE's legal and natural mother under California law (with right of full legal and physical custody);
2. Give her a "legal and responsible" dad; i.e., despite JOHN's unfortunate disavowment of JAYCEE, declare him to be a
"legal father" under California law and direct that he be "responsible" for JAYCEE accordingly under California law;
3. Reverse the rulings of the trial court on all major issues as asserted, including the ruling that the Agreement is not enforceable;
4. Issue a decision defining the parameters of parenthood and responsibility in a case with the facts as alleged, and express and define the scope of the State's interest in protecting children such as JAYCEE brought into this world through novel and unconventional means;
5. Issue a ruling on the minor counsel's attorney fee issue as appropriate (and understand the request is made since the benefit inures to JAYCEE and her ability to be heard in this novel case);
6. Promote JAYCEE's welfare and best interests;13
7. Grant JAYCEE such other and further relief as is just and proper including, if appropriate, an award of attorneys fees under Family Code § 3153 or via express directional remand, and including residual relief such as directing change in birth certificate to conform to ruling. (Family Code § 7639).14
DATED: October 29, 1997
Respectfully submitted,
JEFFREY W. DOERINGER,
Attorney for JAYCEE B.
[by appointment of the Court
of Appeal]
1013a(3) CCP Revised 1/1/88
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE
I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 3090 Bristol Street, Suite 220, Costa Mesa, CA 92626.
On October 29, 1997, I served the within documents described as:
MINOR'S OPENING BRIEF
on the interested parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows:
SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
_____BY MAIL: I deposited such envelope, with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the mail at Costa Mesa, California.
____ I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Costa Mesa, California, in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the parties served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing affidavit.
____BY PERSONAL SERVICE: I caused to be delivered such envelope by hand to the office of the addresses.
____BY FACSIMILE: I caused the within documents to be transmitted by telephonic facsimile to:
____(State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.
Executed on October 29, 1997, at Costa Mesa, California.
_______________________________
LINDA D. OWEN
IN RE B.
4 CIV. G022157, OCSC CASE NO 95D002992
Tom Stabile, Esq. Attorney for JOHN B.
SCHWAMB & STABILE
333 City Blvd. W. #710
Orange, CA 92668
Robert W. Walmsley, Esq. Attorney for LUANNE B.
VAN DEUSEN YOUMANS & WALMSLEY, INC.
615 Civic Center Drive W #300
Santa Ana CA 92701-4094
The Hon. Robert D. Monarch Trial Court
ORANGE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
341 The City Drive, Dept. 608
Orange, CA 92668
JAYCEE B. Minor child
[at current address]
Honorable Clerk,
California Supreme Court [5 copies]
300 S. Spring St., 2nd. Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90013-1233
Leslie Ellen Shear [Amicus]
15456 Ventura Blvd.
5th Floor
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403-3018
Mary Roth, Deputy [Amicus]
Office of the Attorney Genera (Anticipated)
50 Fremont St., Ste. 300
San Francisco, CA 94105
A.C.L.U. [Amicus]
1616 Beverly Boulevard (Anticipated)
Los Angeles CA 90026